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U.S. BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT:
THE PERILS OF IMPLEMENTING
STRATEGIC INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
JOHN BEACHBOARD
COLLEGE OF BUSINESS
IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY
BEACH@ISU.EDU
ABSTRACT
The case describes the challenges faced by IT managers at the U.S. Bureau of Land
Management (BLM) in their efforts to upgrade the Bureau’s IT infrastructure while developing the
largest, most complex strategic application ever attempted at the Bureau. After expending 15
years of effort and $400 million, the BLM cancelled the program. The case identifies obstacles
faced by IT and non-IT managers in attempting to implement strategic information technology in
large, complex organizations. Obstacles identified in this case include: the BLM’s culture of
autonomy that tended to undermine support for the initiative, technological limitations that
impacted the selection of technical standards, and organizational resource and knowledge
constraints that adversely impacted the BLM’s ability to manage such a large IT development
effort successfully.
KEYWORDS: IT management, IT implementation, infrastructure, organizational culture
I. THE PROBLEM
The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) spent more than 15 years and $400 million trying to
upgrade its information technology (IT) infrastructure and develop a major software application to
automate land management processes. The centerpiece of this effort, the Automated Land and
Mineral Record System (ALMRS), as delivered by the Bureau’s primary contractor, was dead on
arrival. Using the software was harder and more time-consuming than the stubby pencil
processes it was intended to replace.
After cancellation of the ALMRS development contract, the challenges facing the Bureau were
immense: the automation requirements that ALMRS was intended to support were still valid,
users were dissatisfied with IT upgrades (desktop workstations and office applications) fielded
under the modernization portion of the program, and a backlog of IT requirements built up while
the Bureau was focusing on ALMRS development. Furthermore, the U.S. Congress, the General
Accounting Office (GAO), and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) would be constantly
looking over the Bureau’s shoulder when it came to any future IT investments.
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Recollecting Santayana’s classic warning that “those who ignore history are doomed to repeat it,”
understanding what went wrong on this effort is essential for planning the Bureau’s next steps.
II. BRIEF HISTORY OF BLM
Although the Bureau of Land Management was established officially in 1946, its roots go back
more than 200 years to the time when the new republic of the United States was establishing
policies for surveying and settling new territories. Through the 1800s, U.S. land-use policies
focused on settling and economically developing the resources of the new territories gained in
the nation’s expansion across the continent. The BLM received a relatively unified legislative
mandate only in 1976 when Congress enacted the Federal Land Policy and Management Act
(FLPMA).
Today, the Bureau manages approximately 264 million acres of public land in 28 states, about
one-eighth of the land in the United States. It also manages the mineral estates underlying
another 300 million acres of lands administered by other government agencies or owned by
private interests, and it supports fire suppression on an additional 388 million acres. Most of the
BLM-managed lands are in the western United States and consist of grasslands, forests,
mountain ranges, arctic tundra and deserts. Public resources managed by BLM include
rangelands, timber, minerals, watersheds, wildlife habitats, wilderness and recreation areas, and
archaeological and historical resources.
III. BLM ORGANIZATION
The Bureau is organized into both functional and geographical elements. Functional areas reflect
the Bureau’s primary missions and the activities required for its internal management. They
include:
•

Management of Renewable Resources – fisheries, forests, range and wildlife. Cultural
and recreational programs are also managed in this functional area.

•

Management of Realty and Mineral Resources – solid and fluid mineral extraction and
realty management.

•

Information Resources Management – information technology and resources,
Freedom of Information Act responsibilities.

•

External Affairs – public, legislative, regulatory, intergovernmental affairs.

•

Business and Fiscal Management – budget, finance, property and acquisition
management.

•

Human Resources Management – personnel and equal employment opportunities.

•

Helium Resources Management – operation of national helium storage facilities.

•

Fire Protection Management – detection and suppression of fires on public lands.

As shown in Figure 1, a combination of headquarters-level directorates and national centers
supports these functional areas.
The Bureau is also divided geographically into 12 state/regional offices (BLM employees tend to
use the term “state office,” even though some of these offices actually include multiple states)
that collectively include 59 district offices and 140 resource area offices. These geographically
dispersed organizations are responsible for the on-the-ground, day-to-day execution and
administration of Bureau missions.
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Figure 1. BLM Organization Chart
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IV. INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) AT BLM1
Information technology (IT) expenditures made up more than 10 percent of the Bureau’s total
budget throughout the 1990s.
Recognizing the increasingly critical role of information
technology, the Bureau initiated significant changes in its IRM structure in 1996. The Bureau
defined its IRM mission as follows:
Information Resources Management is responsible for supporting the Bureau’s
mission by facilitating the development and implementation of IRM policies,
standards and programs among its state/field offices, national centers and the
headquarters office. Information Resources Management will also focus on
providing timely and effective support and services to meet customers’
expectations.
As part of the 1996 reorganization, the Bureau established the National IRM Center (NIRMC) to
provide collaborative technical guidance to state/field offices, national centers and the
headquarters IT management group, and to provide lifecycle management of Bureau-wide
systems.
In accordance with provisions of the Information Technology Management Reform Act (ITMRA),
the Bureau also established the position of Chief Information Officer (CIO). The BLM CIO was
charged with:
•

Developing and maintaining the IRM strategic vision

•

Implementing IT standards, methods and policies

•

Developing and promoting the IRM strategic plan

•

Developing and administering IRM policies

•

Developing and implementing IRM performance measures to support BLM missions and
goals

•

Assessing technical competencies required to make use of modern technologies

•

Developing, managing and administering IRM security programs

•

Serving as the Bureau’s external IRM liaison

•

Overseeing effectiveness of IT programs.

Each of the Bureau’s state offices maintained an internal IRM activity intended to serve it
and its subordinate field offices’ needs. State IT managers, who worked for the state directors,
received most of their funding from the state office budget. Traditionally, they enjoyed a great
degree of latitude in purchasing information technology and developing applications. The size
and capability of the state IRM activities varied considerably, depending on the interests and
funding success of the state supported. Prior to the modernization program, state IRM activities
planned, implemented, operated, and maintained most of the local servers, desktop automation,
local area networks and links to the Bureau’s wide area network (WAN).
The Bureau established two IRM advisory groups to help formulate the Bureau’s strategic IRM
direction, coordinate standards and policies, and prioritize IRM investment tactics:
1. The Information Resources Management Review Council (IRMRC) and
2. The Information Resources Management Advisory Council (IRMAC).

1

The terms IT and IRM are used interchangeably in this case in recognition of the convention that
government entities generally use the term IRM while practitioners and researchers employ a variety of
terms, including: IT management, IS management and IRM. For discussion see: [Boaden & Lockett, 1991].
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The IRMRC consisted of the assistant directors of the major program areas (including the CIO
and the NIRMC co-directors) as well as the assistant directors from each state office. The
IRMRC was responsible for providing the following strategic guidance:
•

Strategic direction in the use of information resources within the Bureau

•

Investment strategy for the acquisition of information technology

•

General direction on the management of the BLM information technology investment

•

Strategic goals and objectives to be met in the management of information resources.

The IRMAC included the IRM directors from each of the state offices and selected national-level
IRM managers. The IRMAC was intended to provide a forum for sharing IRM-related information
among the state offices and to advise the CIO concerning local requirements, concerns, and
capabilities in each region.
V. STRATEGIC IT IMPLEMENTATION AT BLM: MODERNIZING LAND MANAGEMENT
INFORMATION RESOURCES
Bureau managers faced an extremely large task to integrate and standardize IRM resources
across eight major functional areas and 200 geographically dispersed locations. The BLM
managed more than one billion paper documents related to its land management responsibilities
such as land surveys and surveyor notes, tract books, land patents, mining claims, oil and gas
leases, and land and mineral case files. Many of the land titles and much of the survey data date
back to the birth of the nation.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s the Bureau began to use information technology to improve its
core business processes. However, the BLM still found it difficult to handle its case-processing
because its work load increased at the same time that its work force was reduced. Using a
combination of manual and automated systems, the Bureau processed six million information
requests per year.
IMPLEMENTING THE AUTOMATED LAND AND MINERAL RECORD SYSTEM (ALMRS)
In the mid-1980s, the Bureau began planning to develop an automated land and mineral records
system and defined the fundamental scope of the ALMRS/Modernization Program in 1989. This
program consisted of the three major components identified in Table 1. In May 1991, the Bureau
awarded a $400 million contract to Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC) for infrastructure
design, acquisition and installation, and development of the ALMRS and the Geographic
Coordinate Data Base (GCDB) databases (Table 1). This contract was in addition to a separate
contract, awarded to CSC in 1988, for developing the geographic data required to populate the
GCDB database.
The Bureau’s executive leadership endorsed the program, viewed ALMRS/Modernization as an
important contribution to its strategic goal of serving current and future publics and designated
the deputy director to serve as the ALMRS/Modernization Program Manager.
The BLM planned the ALMRS/Modernization implementation to proceed in phases. Over a
period of four years, the Bureau fielded early capabilities by installing UNIX-based desktop
workstations and servers, commercial office automation software, local area networks, wide area
network connectivity, and electronic mail throughout the entire Bureau. By 1998, more than
6,000 workstations were installed and 8,000 employees trained. The Bureau also successfully
migrated 11 legacy COBOL database applications to operate under the Informix database
management system acquired under the ALMRS contract. The timeline, shown in Table 2 on
page 684, summarizes major events in the development of the ALMRS/Modernization Program
and the evolution of the program over time. Additional program implementation information is
presented in Appendix I.
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Table 1. ALMRS/Modernization Program Major Component Breakdown
Major Component

Explanation

Infrastructure Modernization

Selection, purchase and installation of enterprise-wide IT
infrastructure, including: desktop workstations and office
automation applications, servers, printers, groupware
applications, local- and wide-area networking, and
conversion of 11 legacy COBOL applications to the newly
adopted standard database management system
(DBMS).

ALMRS Development

Design and implementation of corporate data
architecture, enterprise-wide database management
system, geographic information system capabilities and
multiple applications designed to automate critical
Bureau business processes.

Geographic Coordinate Data Base
(GCDB) Project

A geographic database that would contain coordinates of
legal boundaries and other survey characteristics of
public lands that would be linked to the ALMRS
databases and hosted on the modernization
infrastructure.

The Bureau experienced multiple delays and cost overruns. Operational testing conducted after
delivery in 1996 found more than 200 high-priority software problems. The Bureau and its
contractors worked intensely to resolve the problems found in the 1996 testing. However, after
an additional two years of development, the Bureau determined that the ALMRS software
delivered in late 1998 still failed to meet the needs of its intended users. In early 1999, the
Bureau concluded that it was unlikely that CSC would be able to correct the deficiencies
identified and cancelled the program.2
VI. IT ISSUES: IN THE WORDS OF BLM MANAGERS
The objectives of the ALMRS/Modernization Program were developed from an extensive
planning effort and were validated both within the BLM, by the Department of Interior and by the
U.S. Congress. The following six narratives represent core issues identified and discussed by
both IT and non-IT managers within the BLM. These narratives provide a rich understanding of
the challenges faced in implementing the ALMRS/Modernization Program.
ALMRS: AN “800-POUND GORILLA”
ALMRS did provide a strategic capability for the BLM.
In the strategic plan, there is a chapter on improving land resource title
information.... This is ALMRS. (senior program manager)
Despite the resource investment and fielding delays, this manager strongly believed the program
was falsely maligned:
To say BLM management does not support ALMRS is absolutely false... if you
go to the state directors, you’ll find pretty good support.

2

The GAO reported $67.5 million was spent on developing the failed software and another $74.6 million in
project management expenses. Additional expenses covered physical additions to infrastructure, legacy
system conversion, data conversion to new systems, and training.
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Table 2. ALMRS/Modernization Program Timeline
Timeframe

Milestone

Early-to-mid
1980s

Early program conceptualized as automated land and mineral case
processing system with estimated lifecycle cost of $240 million.

1988

ALMRS scope expanded to include GCDB and infrastructure modernization
requirements, with estimated lifecycle cost of $880 million.

1989

Program scope refined and cost estimate revised. Lifecycle costs estimated
at $575 million. A separate contract for development of GCDB awarded
with final delivery projected for September 1993.

2nd Qtr 1991

Major 10-year development and support contract for ALMRS/Modernization
Program awarded to CSC at projected cost of $403 million (the contract
came in under the government estimate). Projected Initial Operating
Capability (IOC): 3rd Qtr 1995. Software to be delivered in three builds with
installation to commence after successful integration testing.

1992-1994

Over 4,000 workstations installed, three legacy applications converted and
build 1, consisting of approximately 46,000 lines of code delivered and
successfully tested on time.

1995

Installation of modernization infrastructure continues. Delays experienced
with the release of build 2 software (approximately 120,000 lines of code).
IOC rescheduled from 3rd Qtr 1995 to 3rd Qtr 1996.

Mid-to-late 1996

Testing finds over 203 high-priority problems (problems causing system
crashes, application halts, or failures to execute required functions) and
serious performance problems. Problems are also discovered with data
integrity and the performance of modernization workstations and servers.
Based on congressional direction, BLM contracts with separate firm to
perform independent verification and validation testing of CSC’s
development. IOC rescheduled from 3rd Qtr 1996 to 3rd Qtr 1997.

1996

BLM reorganizes its internal IT structure, hires a CIO, and establishes
Bureau-wide IRM oversight committees: IRMRC and IRMAC.

1997-1998

BLM and contractors work to eliminate high-priority problems. Selected
features intended for inclusion in the IOC release are deferred due to delays
and cost overruns. Approximately $100 million spent for technology
refreshment: i.e., upgrading workstations and servers to support new
versions of operating systems and applications and to increase overall
system performance. IOC rescheduled from 3rd Qtr 1997 to 3rd Qtr 1998.

3rd Qtr 1998

Operational acceptance testing revealed that the software as delivered did
not support BLM business needs, was too complex, and would impede
worker productivity.

1st Qtr 1999

BLM cancelled the ALMRS/GCDB development effort.

Data for this timeline derived primarily from GAO reports cited in the Bibliography..

Another program manager predicted,
There is going to be a lot of excitement as soon as they realize [what ALMRS
can do]. Right now the impression is that we are only doing this for
mineralogists and geologists... when we get it out there and people can see the
various uses for themselves, it is going to sell itself.
Even those who were concerned about how ALMRS was being executed understood its potential
value.
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I am not being negative; I thought this whole thing (ALMRS) was thought- and
planned-out great, it still is great and will serve the purpose, which is case
processing... it is a lot of things that folks want. (state IT manager)
Yet Bureau managers recognized that users were tired of waiting for ALMRS and “want to see it
now... it should be a big benefit but we’ve been talking about this stuff for years and have not
seen anything yet.”
The modernization infrastructure was another problem. At the time the program was conceived,
UNIX-based systems provided the only standards-compliant, scalable computing platform
capable of displaying complex land and title data on maps. To reduce the number of computing
environments that IT staff would have to support, the Bureau decided to standardize its entire IT
architecture on UNIX workstations.
Acceptance of the UNIX platform as a standard for office automation was almost unanimously
poor.
In a survey of Bureau staff, 110 out of 111 comments made regarding the
ALMRS/Modernization Program were negative; most of the comments identified problems with
the UNIX systems. In the view of the staff, the UNIX office automation applications were difficult
to use, lacked functionality, and impeded the sharing of data with external organizations.
Many of my co-workers and I are abandoning the UNIX system because it is
inflexible, and I cannot purchase the software I need to do my job. (Bureau
employee)
Some comments were harsher.
Modernization is a fiasco. It seeks to employ obsolete hardware platforms that
will be utilized to run applications that are not designed to work with networking.
The users find it very non-user-friendly.
Other users provided specific examples of their problems:
I am hindered by the X-terminal platform. It is unstable, which is frustrating,
especially when it locks me out during annual work-plan assignments... our
IRM, one person, can’t always be on duty, and it’s impossible to get work done
if the machines don’t work.
Another serious problem with ALMRS was the resources allocated to the program. Quite simply,
the ALMRS/Modernization Program was so large and complex that national-level managers were
unable to devote sufficient attention or resources to other Bureau IT needs.
We are doing IT work with internal resources. The IRM folks are pretty much
100 percent looking at getting ALMRS running. And pretty much the rest of the
computer needs are not only backseat, I’d say they’re in the trunk of the car
somewhere! So we are kind of on our own. (program manager)
This opinion was not isolated
ALMRS is an 800-pound gorilla. The problem (of accomplishing other IRM
functions) has been ALMRS consuming so much of the IT resources and
management attention, particularly with continuing delays. (national-level IT
manager)
TECHNOLOGY DRIVES A RE-EXAMINATION OF BUREAU IT MANAGEMENT PRACTICES
With expanding use of network-enabled office automation, information technology became
essential for performing mission-related work. Senior program managers discussed the impact of
prolonged LAN outages that virtually brought work to a standstill at BLM headquarters. One
commented,
A (LAN) server went out for four or five hours yesterday... we need a rerouting
capability so we can stay in business. Systems are becoming mission-critical;
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when the power goes down we are forced into paralysis. (senior program
manager)
The senior program managers and their staffs were not merely inconvenienced by such events;
they were effectively “out of business” during the outage. Accordingly, these managers
recognized the importance that IT was playing in their daily operations and were vitally interested
in ensuring that adequate investments be made to minimize operational disruptions.
The senior management level increasingly recognized that technology was driving the Bureau
toward standardization.
Technology is forcing us… to work together, to have standard policies and
procedures to follow. (national-level IT manager)
A senior program manager commented,
Where local IRM folks have their own [mini-computers] and their own
applications, as we implement modernization, that will have to go away,
because we will not be able to maintain a national network.
Yet, technical standards represent a serious source of tension.
IRM needs to quit dictating what kind of computers we have. Standardization
does not work. It only adds resentment and lack of local control... Standards
may have a place... but to apply standards carte blanche is counterproductive.
(Bureau employee)
Many managers recognized the need to balance the tension between technical standards and
local innovations.
Some standards about the way data go in and come out have to be maintained,
or the system collapses, but there must be a balance between dictatorial
standards and local innovations. (senior program manager)
The rapid evolution of commercially available information technologies represented another
source of frustration. Some users and managers viewed the technology fielded with ALMRS as
being outdated before it was delivered.
We need to make sure we invest to keep everything top notch – to make the
system better. (program manager)
However, other staff strongly felt that continually implementing new technology was
counterproductive.
We need to balance our real needs versus the fact that everyone wants the
latest and greatest technology. (Bureau employee)
A state-level IT manager emphatically declared that the Bureau needs to “quit chasing
technology.”
Each year everyone wants new toys, and we end up managing data rather than
[land] resources. (Bureau employee)
POLICIES DO NOT ENSURE ADEQUATE FUNDING
One area of near-unanimity was the agreement among Bureau program managers, IT managers,
and staff about the inadequate resources available to accomplish the Bureau’s mission.
Competition for internal resources was the single most contentious IT management issue in the
Bureau. The investment in ALMRS necessarily reallocated money and staffing from other
mission-related programs.
There was always frustration; there is no problem that you could not use more
resources on. But [the money] has to come from somewhere.
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In addition, the allocation of IT investments was an issue. How much of the resources should be
invested in developing the strategic infrastructure versus how much should be spent for IT
support of day-to-day operations?
There are 20-year-old systems that require redesign that are being ignored. (state IT
manager)
Resource limitations directly impacted the effectiveness of the ALMRS implementation and user
acceptance of the modernization products that were delivered. Shortfalls in the development
budget prevented the Bureau from including all of the desired features and capabilities in the
proposed initial software release. Numerous comments concerned the lack of adequate training
on the new systems and applications:
Training is always the first thing to cut when dollars are thin.
Bureau IT managers also found it difficult to fund unanticipated hardware upgrades required to
support new software releases.
Finally, resource constraints limited the ability of Bureau management to comply faithfully with
federal IT management policies.
Money and time: even if you have the money, it is difficult to find the time and
training to comply with federal IT management policies. … Policies provide no
funding for solutions. (state IT manager)
SENIOR-LEVEL TECHNICAL EXPERTISE AS GOOD AS THE FIELD’S
The IT staff expressed concern about how well senior managers understood the capabilities and
limitations of technology.
Non-IT managers are quick to criticize high cost and lack of solutions to
business problems, but they fail to accept technical realities and complications
inherent to building Bureau-wide solutions. (national-level IT staff member)
Anticipating an upcoming meeting, a senior IT manager worried that listeners’ “eyes are going to
glaze over” during an upcoming discussion of linking technology to business needs.
IT managers also expressed concerns about their own technical and project-management
abilities. A state-level IT manager was concerned that higher-level IT staff no longer maintained
day-to-day contact with the users and the systems they operated. The loss of knowledge was
not purely technical. Understanding of user problems, capabilities and needs also diminished.
There is an issue of getting into management and losing the day-to-day
involvement and use of the applications. So management can be good, but I
am seeing problems with folks who are making the decisions that do not really
know the day-to-day stuff.
A national-level IT manager admitted that,
As the central folks concentrate on keeping informed on ALMRS capability and
technology, the field is trying to pay attention to what the field wants and is more
in tune with what is needed.
Further indication of the erosion of the technical skills of higher-level managers came from
another national-level IT manager. He recognized that if the central IT activity were going to
successfully manage Bureau-wide IT systems,
You are going to have to get a lot of technical expertise that is at least as good
as what the field has,
implying that this level was not achieved.
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BLM CULTURE: “I’M NOT SURE IF YOU CAN CHANGE IT; JUST WAIT UNTIL THEY ALL
DIE OFF!”
BLM people interviewed believed that the organization’s culture played a significant role in
determining how information technology was managed within the Bureau. They recognized
attitudes and operational practices that worked against establishing a strong, centralized IT
management function.
Once funding allocations were made, the 12 state offices operated with considerable autonomy.
The BLM is organizationally decentralized... field offices are independent from
state offices, which are independent from national…. The Bureau culture is
very state-oriented. Oregon is different from Idaho. (program manager)
At the state level, IT staffing and funding decisions were made by local directors. Over time, the
differences in state-office funding and priorities led to significant differences in size and capability
among the state IRM organizations. This variation made building consensus on Bureau-wide
capabilities extremely difficult
The BLM’s state IRM organizations function as 12 different companies... this
reflects BLM culture. (national-level IT manager)
There has been tremendous suspicion when a state wanted access to district
data: ‘Why? Would they use it against us?’ There’s always a tendency toward
suspicion because somebody’s looking over your shoulder for the wrong
reasons. The attitude is so inherent. (another national-level IT manager)
The manager continued,
There has been a certain amount of arrogance by the state office staff, and I
speak through experience at several levels. Attitudes are hard to change, I’m
not sure if you can change it; just wait until they all die off!
A CONTROL MENTALITY AT THE TOP CREATES A PULL TOWARD DECENTRALIZATION
IN THE FIELD
Disparaging comments were made about the lack of central control: e.g., “the psychology has
been against centralized control.”
The programs have a lot of independence: If Oil and Gas needs to develop a
program, it will budget for it; there is almost no control. (national-level IT
manager)
Control was also on the minds of some who did not view it so favorably. They thought too many
“old-school control types [within the IT function] still pushing the central organization.”
IT management works best when it is part of the management team, not sitting
in a dictatorial or control mode.” (program manager)
Program managers were also concerned with losing control over their information systems. One
manager insisted that, “users must be able to tweak things.”
While the NIRMC focused on the ALMRS/Modernization Program, the state IRM activities were
left largely on their own implementing unique applications in support of local requirements.
However, Bureau-wide funding constraints were starting to inhibit local development, and as
existing state-office mini-computers were replaced by the UNIX systems, state IT managers were
concerned about losing even more local flexibility.
The previous BLM CIO found herself pulling for centralization with respect to the Bureau’s
internal IT operations; yet she desired little control from the Department of the Interior’s (DOI)
CIO. Concerning possible development of a DOI-wide IT architecture, she simply stated,
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I do not think that makes sense. The department has pretty much delegated
that down to Bureau, so there is a lot of independence to work things out within
the Bureau.
The CIO recognized that the centralized IT activity (the NIRMC) did not have the
resources to control all aspects of information technology within the Bureau. For example, the
Bureau inventoried its data applications and identified more than 800, the vast majority of which
were developed at the state level. While the CIO worked under the policy mandate to reduce
incompatible and often redundant “stovepipe” systems, she recognized that it was not possible to
tackle all of these systems at once.
The approach we have agreed to is, when we start making changes, or
someone is coming up with a new system, that’s when we need to stop and
look at it…We do not get rid of redundancies for the sake of getting rid of
redundancies; we time it so that it makes sense.
VII. WHAT WENT WRONG: MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES
Section V presented an overview of the ALMRS/Modernization Program accomplishments and its
cancellation. Section VI provided insights into the thinking of Bureau IT and non-IT managers
about the ALMRS/Modernization Program and the general impact of information technology on
the Bureau’s mission and organization. The interviews on which Section VI were based occurred
prior to the program’s cancellation. This section discusses results of interviews held after the
program’s cancellation.
The ALMRS/Modernization Program received considerable management oversight by
department-level IT managers, OMB, GAO, and Congress. Program oversight consisted
primarily of monitoring Bureau compliance with federal IT management policies. The extensive
external oversight, particularly by the GAO, provided a unique opportunity to compare the
documented observations about the failure by external personnel with those of Bureau IT
managers.
In an interview by Federal Computer Weekly, the GAO concluded that over the course of a
lengthy planning and implementation process, project requirements became stale and that the
BLM was “using technology that had really been eclipsed by the Windows technology of today”
[Tillett, 1999]. That article also quoted a Department of Interior employee as stating that Bureau
managers “should have recognized the problems five years ago.”
Before Congress, GAO testified that the lack of system architecture was a “key reason why
ALMRS’ initial operational capability (IOC) did not meet the Bureau’s business needs” [General
Accounting Office, 1999]. The GAO also reported on several program deficiencies that it deemed
contributed substantially to the ALMRS failure. According to the GAO, the BLM did not develop a
system architecture nor formulate a concept of operations nor ever develop a credible schedule.
In addition, the GAO determined that BLM faced “serious risks” throughout the
ALMRS/Modernization Program because the BLM had not:
•

Established a robust configuration management program

•

Established a security plan or security architecture

•

Established transition plans

•

Established operations and maintenance plans

•

Planned a complete stress test

Not surprisingly, senior BLM IT managers expressed a somewhat different perspective on the
failure of their program. After the decision to cancel was made, key IT managers identified the
primary cause of the program’s cancellation to be the prime contractor’s failure to provide
applications that met usability and performance requirements. Unfortunately, the functional
requirements included in the contract did not adequately specify required user-system
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interactions and system performance. The IT managers recognized that the lack of performance
specifications probably contributed to the contractor’s failure to deliver an acceptable product.
The IT managers also expressed disappointment with the services obtained from the
independent verification and validation (IVV) contractor. Under the direction of Congress, the
BLM hired Mitre Technical Services Corporation (Mitretek) to help manage its prime contractor.
Only later did the Bureau determine that the IVV contractor had taken a managerial approach in
determining whether recommended development processes were being followed. This approach
failed to reveal how well the processes were being executed from a technical perspective. BLM’s
IT managers concluded that Mitretek employed “management folks” on the project instead of
engineers and systems designers capable of reviewing the appropriateness of the technical
solutions offered by the prime contractor and consequently did not identify design deficiencies
during the development process.
BLM IT managers also argued that external direction and policy-driven guidance were, at least in
some cases, detrimental. For example, Department of Interior officials directed that the Bureau’s
deputy director be put in charge of the ALMRS Program. As a result of this decision, the director
whose unit would be the primary beneficiary of the ALMRS application was not active in
managing that aspect of the program. Senior BLM IT managers felt that that director’s lack of
involvement may have resulted in poorer user participation in the development process.
Furthermore, in the BLM IT’s managers view, the strong management support of the program
within the Bureau and the Department of Interior perhaps contributed to continuing the program
for so long. The Bureau documented more than 200 high-priority deficiencies with the application
design and seriously considered canceling or refocusing the program in 1996. According to the
IT managers interviewed, Department of Interior personnel strongly urged the Bureau to “stay the
course.” The managers believed that the basis for this decision may have been the Department
of Interior’s unwillingness to admit to Congress the full extent of the program’s problems.
VIII. EPILOGUE
With the termination of the ALMRS/Modernization Program came a turnover in senior IT
management. The Bureau hired contractors to assess the Bureau’s IT management capabilities
and to assist in the development of a new Bureau-wide information architecture. The BLM
analyzed the ALMRS software and documentation and concluded that, due to the advances in
technology that occurred since the project was formulated, little could be salvaged from the
software development effort.
TEACHING NOTE
Teaching notes for this case can be obtained by people who are listed as faculty members in the
IS Faculty Directory. Contact the author at beach@cob.isu.edu
Editor’s Note: This case study was fully peer reviewed. It was received on October 23, 2002 and
was published on June 19, 2003. It was with the author four and a half months for two revisions.
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APPENDIX I. THE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT FOR ALMRS/MODERNIZATION
IMPLEMENTATION
A potential difficulty in analyzing this case is appreciating the changes in both information
technology and software development techniques that occurred during the extended life of the
ALMRS/Modernization Program.
While there is still ample opportunity to critique the
performance of the Bureau’s IT managers, we must be careful not to judge them solely in light of
today’s technology and development practices. This appendix provides some additional
technical detail and a little historical context to help in analyzing this case.
SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT IN THE MID-1980S
The BLM pursued a classic “waterfall” approach to systems development in contrast with “spiral”
or rapid application development (RAD) models more commonly used to develop large complex
applications today. In the 1970s and 1980s, systems analysts would be assigned to work with
users to develop a comprehensive set of requirements documents to be turned over to the
developers. Several difficulties are associated with this approach. First, it can be difficult for
users to understand and articulate their functional requirements fully early in a project because
they may not fully appreciate the capabilities of the proposed technology to support their
business processes. The user requirements are represented in a series of documents that users
may have a difficult time understanding. These requirement documents would often form the
basis for development contracts. Second, the waterfall model as generally applied tends to
U.S. Bureau of Land Management: The Perils of Implementing Strategic Information Technology
by J. Beachboard

692

Communications of the Association for Information Systems (Volume 11, 2003) 678-694

aggregate too many functional requirements into too few software releases -- thus making each
release larger and more difficult to manage. Lengthy delays can occur between the development
of the requirement and the delivery of the initial software release. Requirements may change, but
when so much development effort is expended there is a legitimate reluctance to change the
fundamental application design even if users are dissatisfied. Historically, this type of
development effort tends to isolate the developers from the application’s intended users.
It is possible to infer that several of these problems occurred on the ALMRS development effort.
Some of the functional requirements were fairly clear since the Bureau already automated some
of its mineral and oil leasing processes. However, the earlier automation efforts were
constrained because much of the information that the users would need was only available in
hard copy format. A key element of the ALMRS development effort was to convert the billion-plus
documents containing relevant land information into a readily retrievable electronic format. Note,
however, that this effort pre-dates the vast majority of document and content management
products available today. In addition, a significant portion of land management information is in
the form of maps. While some of this information can be represented adequately in a structured
text format, some critical information is displayed more effectively graphically (e.g., depicting
elevation data with contour lines).
Because ALMRS was to serve as the BLM’s primary organizational database, the Bureau tried to
identify virtually all its data needs. That is, in addition to mineral and oil leasing, the ALMRS
applications were to support diverse data and processing requirements associated with range
management, timber sales, wildlife habitat management, historical preservation, and recreational
use of public lands. The breadth of functional processes and associated data greatly increased
the size and complexity of the development effort and consequently the technical challenges
facing the Bureau and its primary development contractor.
Commercial geographic information system (GIS) applications and the capabilities of commercial
relational database management systems (DBMS) were in relatively early stages of development
at the time the ALMRS program was initiated. The BLM (actually its primary contractor) was
attempting to develop an application that effectively integrated relational and spatial data and
supported a wide variety of transaction processing requirements. Fifteen years later, in 2003, we
see commercial applications such as ESRI’s ArcGIS that, while extremely complicated, are more
capable of supporting such requirements.
INFORMATION TECHNOLGY IN THE MID-1980
The desire to develop applications combining complex relational and graphical data potentially
accessible from 200 geographically distributed locations posed a significant challenge to the
technology available at that time. The Bureau considered a mainframe-based solution (along
with the networking expenses that such a solution would require) too expensive and proposed
implementing a distributed, client-server architecture3. Relative to current technology, processor
speed, memory capacity and IO performance were relatively limited for these distributed servers.
Many developers in the mid-‘80s and early ‘90s failed to recognize performance requirements
that multi-table relational databases placed on servers. These performance limitations even led
to the development of specialized hardware optimized for hosting relational databases: i.e.,
database machines.
Given the powerful capabilities of current Windows-based systems, it is easy to forget that at the
time the Bureau made its decisions, the Wintel-based systems simply were not capable of
supporting the projected performance and graphical display requirements required by the ALMRS
and GCDB applications. While it might have been possible to select a vendor proprietary system
such as a DEC PDP series computer running the VMS operating system, Unix was widely viewed

3

See http://www.sei.cmu.edu/str/descriptions/clientserver_body.html for a brief introduction to client server
architectures.
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as the most open enterprise-class operating system.4 The selection of Unix-based servers was
consistent with federal standards and emerging industry practice.
The case discusses user dissatisfaction with the selection of a Unix-based desktop standard.
Unix workstations were required to provide the graphic display capabilities (X-windows) on the
desktop needed to access the ALMRS and GCDB applications. The X-window emulation
packages for PCs were becoming available during the early 1990s, but their performance was
generally considered unacceptable. Accordingly, all staff needing access to ALMRS would
require Unix workstations.
Note also that Wintel systems at that time did not include native support for the TCP/IP protocol
stack required to access the Unix servers. Software capable of supporting TCP/IP protocols
could be purchased but also proved problematic given the memory constraints still existent in the
later versions of Microsoft DOS (e.g., DOS 6.0) and the earlier versions of Windows operating
systems (e.g., Windows 3.1).
It is important to recognize that some technical decisions that appear somewhat dubious in terms
of current technology were much more justifiable given the technology available at the time those
decisions were made. However, nothing written above is meant to suggest that the program
could not have been implemented successfully.
LIST OF ACRONYMS
ALMRS
BLM
CIO
CSC
DBMS
GAO
GCDB
FLPMA
IOC
IRM
IRMAC
IRMRC
IT
ITMRA
IVV
NIRMC
OMB
PRA
WAN
Wintel

Automated Land and Mineral Record System
Bureau of Land Management
Chief Information Officer
Computer Sciences Corporation
Database Management System
General Accounting Office
Geographic Coordinate Data Base
Federal Land Policy and Management Act
Initial Operating Capability
Information Resources Management
Information Resources Management Advisory Council
Information Resources Management Review Council
information technology
Information Technology Management Reform Act
independent verification and validation
National IRM Center
Office of Management and Budget
Paperwork Reduction Act
wide-area network
Systems architectures based on Microsoft’s Windows operating system and
computers incorporating Intel central processing units
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Note that the Unix offerings by major workstation/server manufacturers, such as HP, DEC, IBM and Sun,
were not absolutely compatible.
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